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Abstract 
Social categorization is claimed to elicit a tendency to conform to ingroup norms, 
which may result in attitude change after exposure to information on the opinions 
of other ingroup members. It was hypothesized that the degree to which arguments 
represented ingroup norms, i.e., were prototypical, would aflect their potential injluence 
on attitudes, such that prototypical arguments would be perceived as being of higher 
quality and would elicit more attitude change. Moreover, prototypical arguments were 
expected to elicit more argument elaboration. Two experiments were designed to test 
these predictions. In Experiment 1 subjects were exposed to both a set of pro and 
a set of contra arguments, while one of the sets was allegedly prototypical of ingroup 
attitudes. In Experiment 2 subjects were exposed to either prototypical or a-prototypical 
pro or contra arguments allegedly originating from in- or outgroup. In both studies 
conformity to ingroup norms was observed. In addition, prototypical ingroup arguments 
elicited higher quality ratings in the first study. Indications of higher elaboration of 
prototypical ingroup arguments were found. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years increasing attention has been turned to social influence 
processes as affected by social categorizations (e.g. Mackie, 1986; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987; Hogg and Turner, 1987; Abrams and Hogg, 
1990; Wilder, 1990). These authors assert that social influence processes like conform- 
ity and group polarization are mediated by group identification. Extending earlier 
theorizing on conformity (e.g. Sherif, 1936; Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; 
Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Kiesler and Kiesler, 1969), Turner et al. (1987) stress 
the intergroup context in which conformity processes take place. Turner et al. contend 
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in their self-categorizational approach to social influence that identification with 
a social group to social influence that identification with a social group will elicit 
a tendency to conform to ingroup norms. This tendency may affect group members’ 
attitudes, as illustrated by e.g. Mackie (1986; Mackie and Cooper, 1984) and Abrams, 
Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1990). Both Mackie and Abrams et al. 
assert that after exposure to information about attitudes held by others, subsequent 
influence of this information on own attitudes is affected by group membership 
of the source and receiver. For example, Mackie (1986) presented subjects with argu- 
ments allegedly generated in a group discussion. The source group was either an 
ingroup or an outgroup. Subjects could derive the source group opinion towards 
the attitude topic from the arguments presented. Subjects’ attitudes turned out to 
be more affected by exposure to ingroup arguments than by exposure to outgroup 
arguments, presumably as a consequence of the hypothesized tendency to conform 
to ingroup norms. 
The mediating role of group norms is further illustrated in a study by Turner, 
Wetherell and Hogg (1989). Subjects participated in a group discussion on choice 
dilemmas involving more or less risky courses of action. Prior to the discussion 
either a risky or a cautious group norm was experimentally induced. Subjects in 
allegedly risky groups displayed more risky decisions than subjects in groups that 
were presumably cautious, i.e. subjects tended to behave according to the group 
norm. Turner et al. maintain that this result is due to a tendency to perceive arguments 
which are in line with the group norm (i.e. pro risk arguments in case of a risky 
norm and pro caution arguments in case of a cautious norm) as stronger and more 
valid than arguments opposing the group norm. That is, arguments representing 
the group norm (‘prototypical’ arguments) are more persuasive. However, since the 
group discussion was not under experimental control in the Turner et al. study, 
further testing of this hypothesis seems necessary. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the present study subjects were exposed both to arguments supporting and oppos- 
ing the use of university entrance exams. These arguments were allegedly generated 
by own group and were presented as being either prototypical or a-prototypical 
of the normative group opinion. We hypothesized subjects would conform to the 
group norm, that is, to the position advocated by the prototypical arguments (hypoth- 
esis la). Furthermore, as contended by Turner et al. (1989), we expected prototypical 
arguments would be perceived to be of higher quality than a-prototypical arguments 
(hypothesis 1 b). 
Recently, it has been proposed that social categorization will not only elicit a 
tendency to conform to ingroup norms, but will also result in a higher motivation 
to elaborate ingroup communication as compared to outgroup communication 
(Mackie, Worth and Asuncion, 1990; Van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1991). Since 
one’s primary interest supposedly lies with one’s own group and group norms, infor- 
mation expressing ingroup attitudes was hypothesized to elicit a higher motivation 
to elaborate. Both Mackie et al. and Van Knippenberg and Wilke presented subjects 
with strong or weak arguments allegedly originating from in- or outgroup. Argument 
quality is assumed to affect attitudes to a greater extent under conditions of high 
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message elaboration (cf. Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). 
When a message is intensively scrutinized and the message content is carefully eva- 
luated, strong arguments may result in substantial attitude change while weak argu- 
ments will not. This differential influence is less apparent under conditions of low 
elaboration. both Mackie et al. and Van Knippenberg and Wilke found attitudes 
to be affected by argument quality after exposure to ingroup arguments, but not 
after exposure to outgroup arguments. This result was taken to be indicative of 
more elaboration of the ingroup message. 
In the studies by Mackie et al. and Van Knippenberg and Wilke arguments could 
be assumed to be prototypical of the source group. The very fact that ingroup argu- 
ments presumable represented ingroup attitudes may have elicited the apparent higher 
motivation to elaborate ingroup communication. It is proposed here that when argu- 
ments are less prototypical of ingroup norms they will not only elicit less attitude 
change, but may also result in less message elaboration than prototypical arguments 
(hypothesis 2). The quality of the presented arguments was varied experimentally 
in the present study to test this hypothesis. Attitudes were predicted to be affected 
to a greater extent by the quality of prototypical arguments than by the quality 
of a-prototypical arguments. 
Method 
Overview and design 
Subjects were confronted with two sets of arguments concerning the use of university 
entrance exams. One set contained arguments supporting entrance exams, the other 
consisted of arguments opposing the use of these exams. The arguments were allegedly 
generated by the subjects’ own group (psychology undergraduates). Quality of the 
presented pro and contra arguments was varied independently across conditions. 
In addition, one of the sets allegedly represented the source position (which was 
experimentally varied), while the other did not. The order in which the sets were 
presented was varied over conditions. This yielded a 2(source norm: supporting/ 
opposing) x 2(quality of pro arguments: strong/weak) X 2(quality of contra argu- 
ments) x 2(order of presentation) between-subjects design. The main dependent 
variables were attitudes assessed on pre- and post-test, cognitive responses to the 
message and argument recall. 
Subjects 
Ninety-five psychology undergraduates (28 male, 67 female) from the University 
of Leiden, the Netherlands, participated in the experiment, receiving Dfl. 10 for 
their cooperation. Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. No 
initial differences in attitudes towards entrance exams, as assessed on the pretest, 
were found ( M =  14.28, on a 31-point rating scale with 31 indicating agreement 
with the use of entrance exams). 
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Stimulus material 
The argument sets employed were identical to the ones pretested and used by Van 
Knippenberg and Wilke (1991, Experiment 2). Four sets of three arguments concern- 
ing the use of entrance exams were employed, two sets consisting of strong arguments, 
one set opposing, one set supporting the use of university entrance exams, and two 
sets of weak arguments, one opposing, one supporting entrance exams. Argument 
sets were selected on the basis of a pretest in which strong arguments as compared 
to weak arguments elicited more positive cognitive responses (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981, 1986, see Procedure below) and more positive evaluations on ratings of argu- 
ment quality. E.g. ‘Entrance exams, being a single measurement, are not representa- 
tive of a person’s abilities’ was considered to be a strong argument opposing entrance 
exams, while e.g. ‘It’s perfectly normal to prove you’re capable of fulfilling necessary 
requirements’ was considered a weak argument supporting the use of these exams. 
Procedure 
Pretest attitudes (on 3 1 -point disagree-agree scales) towards a number of issues 
(including the use of university entrance exams) were assessed when subjects volun- 
teered for participation some weeks prior to the actual experiment. 
Subjects attended the experiment in groups of up to eight persons per session. 
They were placed in individual cubicles containing an Apple Mackintosh computer, 
which was used to present all experimental stimuli. Subjects were told that a selection 
was made of arguments concerning the use of entrance exams, allegedly generated 
in a questionnaire filled out by most of the group members. Subjects were to be 
presented with two sets of arguments, one set presumably representative of the source 
opinion, the other set not representative. Sets were explicitly labelled ‘representative’ 
and ‘not representative’. Subjects were exposed to both a set of pro and a set of 
contra arguments. Whether the pro or the contra arguments were said to be prototypi- 
cal of the source opinion was experimentally varied. In addition, the order in which 
the sets were presented was varied over conditions. 
After exposure to the arguments, subjects again expressed their attitudes towards 
entrance exams (post-test) and completed a thought-listing task (cf. Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1981, 1986), reporting the thoughts they had while reading the message. 
Listed thoughts (‘cognitive responses’) were categorized and rated for their evaluative 
content by independent judges. The number of message-related cognitive responses 
may be considered to be indicative of message elaboration. More message elaboration 
is assumed to result in more message-related responses. Furthermore, when processed 
systematically, strong arguments elicit positive (favourable to the message content) 
cognitive responses, while weak arguments elicit negative (unfavourable) responses 
(cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). 
After completing the thought-listing task, subjects rated the quality and the proto- 
typicality of the arguments (7-point scales, higher scores indicating higher quality/ 
prototypicality) and the perceived source group norm (3 1-point disagree-agree scale). 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were requested to write down the presented 
arguments as they remembered them. Argument recall may be considered to be 
an additional indication of message elaboration (more elaboration resulting in higher 
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recall). After the assessment of argument recall, subjects were debriefed and paid 
for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses were performed including the order of argument presentation 
(prokontra) as a between-subjects factor in the design. Since no effects of the order- 
factor were found, and this factor was not related to any of the hypotheses, this 
factor was dropped from the design. 
Source norm, prototypicality and quality 
The manipulation of the source norm turned out to be successful. When a supportive 
source norm was induced, the source group was perceived to be supporting the 
use of university entrance exams ( M =  17.35), while the source group was assumed 
to be opposing these exams ( M =  10.09) when the source norm was opposing the 
use of entrance exams (F(1,87) = 3 4 . 0 4 , ~  <0.0001). 
Ratings of the prototypicality of the arguments were analysed by means of ANOVA 
with the position advocated by the arguments as a within-subjects factor (subjects 
were confronted with both pro and contra arguments). Analysis indicated that the 
prototypicality manipulation was successful (F(1,87) = 19.80, p < 0.0001). When the 
source group norm was supporting of the use of entrance exams pro arguments 
were perceived to be more prototypical ( M  = 4.23) than contra arguments ( M =  3.56, 
t(47) = 2.45, p < 0.02), while the reverse was true when the source group was assumed 
to be opposing the use of entrance exams (pro: M =  3.54; contra: M=4.55 ,  
t(46) = 3 . 8 9 , ~  < 0.0001). 
Strong contra arguments were perceived to be of higher quality ( M  = 4.77) than 
weak contra arguments ( M  = 3.63, F(1,87 = 20.12, p < 0.0001). However, no differ- 
ences in perceived quality were found between strong and weak pro arguments 
( F <  1). This may have been due to the fact that subjects tended to be opposed 
to the use of entrance exams, which might have elicited an overall negative response 
to the pro arguments. 
To test the prediction that prototypical argument would be perceived to be of 
higher quality an ANOVA with the position advocated by the arguments as a within- 
subjects factor was performed. Analysis revealed a source norm by position of argu- 
ments interaction (F( 1,87) = 2 4 . 0 6 , ~  < O . O O O l ) ,  indicating that contra arguments were 
perceived to be of higher quality ( M = 4 . 8 5 )  than pro arguments (M=3 .64 ,  
t(46) = 3.78, p < 0.0001) when the source group norm was opposing the use of 
entrance exams, while contra arguments were rated as being of lower quality 
( M  = 3.54) than pro arguments (M = 4.42, t(47) = 2.93, p < 0.005) when the source 
group was supporting the use of entrance exams. 1.e. prototypical arguments were 
judged to be of higher quality than a-prototypical arguments (hypothesis 1 b). NO 
other tests reached significance. 
Attitudes 
Post-test attitude scores were analysed by means of ANCOVA with pretest scores 
as the covariate (F( 1,86) = 6 1 . 2 2 , ~  < 0.0001, for the regression). A summary of means 
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(adjusted for the pretest) is provided in Table 1. Subjects’ attitudes were more opposed 
to the use of university entrance exams when the source group was assumed to 
be opposing the use of these exams ( M  = 11 32) than when the source group was 
supporting the use of entrance exams ( M =  15.38, (F(1,SS) = 7.05, p < 0.001)). 1.e. 
subjects tended to conform to the source group norm (cf. hypothesis la). No effects 
of argument quality were found, an issue which will be addressed below. 
Table 1. Post-test attitudes, adjusted for the pretest, Experiment 1 
Source norm 
Supporting Opposing 
Contra quality Strong Weak Strong Weak 
Pro quality 
Strong 14.85 18.67 10.61 12.40 
Weak 12.04 15.95 12.41 11.87 
Cognitive responses 
The cognitive responses reported on the thought-listing task were categorized by 
two independent judges. Target of the response was either categorized as related 
to the pro arguments, related to the contra arguments, issue-relevant in general 
or irrelevant. In addition, responses were rated for their evaluative content as positive, 
negative or neutral. Raters agreed in 74 per cent of the cases on the target of the 
response and in 75 per cent of the cases on the evaluative content. Mean scores 
for the two judges were analysed. 
To locate possible differences in elaboration of the pro and contra sets, the numbers 
of cognitive responses explicitly referring to either of the sets were analysed by means 
of ANOVA with the position advocated by the set as a within-subject factor. Contrary 
to predictions, prototypical arguments did not elicit more cognitive responses (which 
would be indicative of higher elaboration) nor did any of the other tests reach signifi- 
cance. Analysis of the general issue-relevant responses yielded no significant results. 
Message evaluation, as expressed by the cognitive responses, was operationalized 
as the difference between the number of positive and the number of negative responses 
related to each set of arguments. Analysis revealed a main effect of the position 
advocated by the arguments (F(1,87) = 6.03, p < 0.02). Contra arguments elicited 
more positive responses ( M  = 0.23) than pro arguments ( M  = -0.13). This effect 
was qualified by the source norm by position interaction (F(1,87) = 7.95, p < 0.006). 
When the source group was opposing the use of entrance exams, contra arguments, 
i.e. prototypical arguments, elicited more positive evaluations ( M  = 0.47) than pro 
arguments ( M =  -0.31, (46) = 4.19, p < O.OOOl), while the evaluation elicited by 
pro ( M  = 0.04) and contra arguments ( M =  -0.01) did not differ in case of a suppor- 
tive source group norm (t(47) < 1). The results for the opposing norm conditions 
are in accordance with the higher ratings of argument quality for prototypical argu- 
ments reported above (cf. hypothesis lb). The absence of a similar effect in the 
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supportive norm conditions might have been due to the fact that subjects tended 
to be opposed to the use of entrance exams, as a consequence of which subjects’ 
reactions to the pro arguments presumably tended to be overall somewhat negative. 
Under conditions of systematic message processing cognitive responses are 
assumed to be predictive of attitude change. The more favourable to the message 
are the responses, the more likely attitude change is to occur. In this sense the 
relationship between the valence of cognitive responses and attitudes is indicative 
of message elaboration. To investigate possible processing differences, regression 
analyses were performed with pretest attitudes and the evaluations of pro and contra 
arguments as predictors of post-test attitudes. When the source group norm was 
supportive the evaluation of the pro arguments was predictive of attitudes (B = 0.36, 
p < 0.01), while the evaluation of the contra arguments was not. This would suggest 
systematic processing of prototypical pro arguments (cf. hypothesis 2). When the 
source norm was opposing, the evaluations of neither pro nor contra arguments 
were predictive of attitudes. Probably prototypical contra arguments were more 
readily accepted, since subjects tended to be opposed to entrance exams themselves. 
Argument recall 
Argument recall was rated by independent judges, who agreed in 91 per cent of 
the cases on the number of correctly recalled contra arguments and in 85 per cent 
of the cases on the number of correctly recalled pro arguments. Mean scores for 
the two judges (ranging from &3 correctly recalled arguments) were analysed. Overall 
recall of contra arguments ( M =  1.53) was higher than recall of pro arguments 
( M  = 1.26, F( 1,87) = 6 . 3 5 , ~  <0.02). This higher recall of contra arguments was quali- 
fied by a significant source norm by position interaction (F(1,87) = 30.22,~ < 0.0001). 
Contra arguments ( M =  1.78) were better recalled than pro arguments ( M  = 0.93, 
t(46) = 6.23, p < 0.0001) when the source norm was opposing the use of entrance 
exams, i.e. when contra arguments were prototypical, while the reverse tended to 
be true when the source group norm was supportive of entrance exams, i.e. when 
pro arguments were prototypical (contra: M = 1.28; pro: M = 1.59, t(47) = - 1.85, 
p < 0.07). Apparently, recall is better for prototypical arguments. This would suggest 
more elaboration of prototypical arguments, as predicted in hypothesis 2. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 clearly support the notion that one is inclined to conform 
to ingroup norms. Moreover, prototypical arguments were perceived to be of higher 
quality than a-prototypical arguments, as was contended by Turner et al. (1989). 
In accordance with the proposition that one is motivated to conform to ingroup 
norms (e.g. Turner et al., 1987; Abrams and Hogg, 1990) it could be argued that 
arguments will be perceived to be of higher quality when they may be considered 
to be prototypical of ingroup norms. Since subjects were only exposed to ingroup 
arguments in Experiment 1, it was not possible to test the proposed influence of 
social categorization on conformity and the perceptions of argument quality. To 
address this issue the source of the arguments (in- or outgroup) was varied in Exper- 
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iment 2. After exposure to ingroup arguments, conformity to the ingroup norm 
was expected (hypothesis 1 a). Moreover, prototypical ingroup arguments were pre- 
dicted to be perceived as being of higher quality (hypothesis lb). 
Although indications of higher elaboration of prototypical arguments were found 
in the results for argument recall and the relationship between valence of cognitive 
responses and attitudes, results for attitudes and the number of cognitive responses 
were not indicative of differential processing. The absence of effects of argument 
quality on attitudes may in part have been due to the fact that subjects were exposed 
to both pro and contra arguments, which might have rendered argument quality 
effects somewhat diffuse. Therefore, subjects in Experiment 2 were exposed to one- 
sided messages, i.e. either to pro or contra arguments. In accordance with the studies 
by Mackie et al. (1990) and Van Knippenberg and Wilke (1991) more elaboration 
of ingroup arguments was expected (hypothesis 2). Moreover, this more extensive 
elaboration was predicted to be most notable when the presented arguments were 
considered to be ingroup prototypical (hypothesis 3). 
Furthermore, an attenuated manipulation of argument prototypicality was 
employed, since it was feared that simply labelling the presented set ‘representative’ 
or ‘not representative’ might be insufficient when the contrast provided by two-sided 
exposure was absent. In Experiment 2 the position advocated by the arguments 
was varied, while the alleged source group norm concerning the issue under scrutiny 
was explicitly stated. The combination of the position advocated by the arguments 
and the source group norm rendered the arguments either prototypical or a-prototypi- 
cal of the source group. 
Method 
Overview and design 
Subjects were confronted with arguments concerning the use of university entrance 
exams, which were allegedly generated by their own group (fellow students) or an 
outgroup (employees of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works). Quality of 
and position advocated by the presented arguments were varied over conditions. 
The opinion held by most members of the source group (either supporting or opposing 
the use of entrance exams) was explicitly stated before message presentation. This 
yielded a 2(source: ingroup/outgroup) x 2(source norm: supporting/opposing) x 
2(argument quality: strong/weak) X 2(position advocated by arguments: prolcontra) 
between-subjects design. Information about the source norm together with the advo- 
cated argument position denoted arguments as either prototypical of the source 
opinion or not. The main dependent variables were attitudes assessed on pre- and 
post-test, cognitive responses to the message and argument recall. 
Subjects 
One hundred and thirty-nine law undergraduates (53 male, 86 female) participated 
in the experiment, receiving Dfl. 10 for their cooperation. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions. No initial differences in attitudes towards 
entrance exams, as measured on the pretest, were found ( M  = 14.28). 
Prototypicality and conformity 149 
Procedure 
Procedures closely resembled those of the first study. Attitudes towards the use 
of university entrance exams were assessed together with the request to volunteer 
in the experiment (pretest). This pretest allegedly took place not only among law 
undergraduates, but also among employees of the Ministry of Transport and Public 
Works (TPW). The TPW was considered to be an outgroup of approximately equal 
status, with no vested interest in the issue (vested interest might result in discounting 
of outgroup arguments, CJ Eagly and Chaiken, 1984)'. 
Following procedures similar to those of the first study, subjects were exposed 
to a set of either pro of contra arguments supposedly originating from in- or outgroup. 
The argument sets were identical to those used in the first study. Before reading 
the arguments, subjects were informed about the attitudes towards the use of entrance 
exams allegedly held by most of the source's members (experimentally varied as 
either supporting or opposing entrance exams). Furthermore, the position advocated 
by the arguments in the set was announced in advance, followed by the statement 
that this subset of arguments could be assumed to be either representative or non- 
representative of the source group opinion. When the source group norm supported 
the use of entrance exams, pro arguments were considered to be prototypical and 
contra arguments were considered a-prototypical, while the reverse was true when 
the source group norm opposed the use of entrance exams. 
After reading the arguments, subjects again expressed their attitudes towards 
entrance exams (post-test), completed a thought-listing task and rated argument 
quality and prototypicality, source group norm and source group status and expertise 
(to control for possible confounding of the source group manipulation). At the end 
of the experiment argument recall was assessed, after which subjects were debriefed 
and paid for their participation. 
Results and discussion 
Source and argument perceptions 
Perceptions of the source group norm towards the use of entrance exams were in 
accordance with the experimental induction (opposing: M = 12.43; supporting: 
M = 20.06, F(1,123) = 52.28, p < 0.0001). The manipulation of the prototypicality 
of arguments appeared to be successful. When the induced source group norm sup- 
ported entrance exams, pro arguments were considered to be more prototypical 
( M =  4.54) than contra arguments ( M =  3.53, F(1,123) = 18.68, p < O.OOOl), while 
pro arguments were considered to be less prototypical ( M =  3.65) than contra argu- 
ments ( M  = 4.74) when the norm opposed the use of entrance exams (F( 1,123) = 20.47, 
p < 0.0001). Analysis of the perceived quality of arguments yielded only a significant 
result for the expected main effect of argument quality (F(1,123) = 14.31,~ < 0.0001). 
' It might be argued that the relevance of the topic under scrutiny is higher for ingroup than for outgroup. 
However, relevance to ingroup is lower than one would expect at first sight, since the attitude measure 
concerns the use of university entrance exams, while subjects themselves had already been admitted 
to university. 
An anonymous reviewer suggested that pro or contra messages from an outgroup source might be 
discounted on the basis of presumed source group characteristics. Although this possibility cannot be 
ruled out completely, pretesting showed subjects to have very little expectation about the outgroup position. 
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Strong arguments were judged to be of higher quality ( M  = 4.58) than weak arguments 
(A4 = 3.78). Note that the predicted higher quality ratings for prototypical ingroup 
arguments (hypothesis lb) were not apparent. No differences in perceived source 
status or expertise were found. 
Attitudes 
Post-test attitude scores were analysed by means of ANCOVA with pretest scores 
as the covariate (F(1,122) = 126.71, p < 0.0001 for the regression). A summary table 
of means (adjusted for the pretest) is displayed in Table 2. Subjects appeared to 
conform to the normative ingroup position, as indicated by the predicted source 
of norm interaction (hypothesis la, F(1,122) = 6.89, p < 0.01). After exposure to 
ingroup arguments, subjects’ attitudes were affected by the source norm, an opposing 
norm resulting in opposing attitudes ( M  = 13.36), while a supporting norm elicited 
slightly supportive attitudes ( M =  16.98, F(1,122) = 7.95, p < 0.006). After exposure 
to outgroup arguments, attitudes were unaffected by the source norm (contra: 
M =  14.05; pro: M =  13.63). This result supports the notion that one’s motivation 
to conform to group norms is mediated by social categorization processes. 
Subjects’ attitudes turned out to be affected by the position advocated by the 
arguments, with contra arguments eliciting more opposing attitudes ( M  = 13.1 I )  than 
pro arguments ( M  = 15.39, F(1,122) = 5 . 7 0 , ~  < 0.02). None of the tests of the effects 
of argument quality reached significance, i.e. no indication of higher elaboration 
of (prototypical) ingroup arguments (hypotheses 2 and 3) was found. This issue 
will be addressed below. 
Table 2. Post-test attitudes, adjusted for the pretest, Experiment 2 
Source norm 
Supporting Opposing 
Position Pro Contra Pro Contra 
Ingroup 
Strong 17.90 18.05 16.09 10.38 
Weak 15.73 16.25 15.59 11.37 
Strong 14.24 11.12 14.29 12.83 
Weak 13.33 11.82 15.99 13.08 
Outgroup 
Cognitive responses 
The cognitive responses assessed by the thought-listing task were categorized by 
two independent judges, rating target of the responses (issue-relevant, source-related 
or irrelevant, 99 per cent agreement) and evaluation expressed by the responses 
(positive, negative or neutral, 75 per cent agreement). Means scores for the two 
judges were analysed. 
Analysis of the number of issue-relevant cognitive responses yielded a significant 
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source by quality interaction (F(1,123) = 5.43, p < 0.03). More issue-relevant 
responses were observed after exposure to strong arguments generated by the ingroup 
( M =  3.33) than after exposure to strong arguments assumed to originate from an 
outgroup (M=2.77, F(1,123)=4.75, p < 0.04), while the reverse tended to be true 
after exposure to weak arguments (ingroup, weak: M =  2.96; outgroup, weak: 
M = 3.23, F(1,123) = 1.13, n.s.). This would seem to indicate that strong ingroup 
arguments and weak outgroup arguments elicited more extensive elaboration. The 
number of source-related responses was considered to be too small for a meaningful 
analysis. 
Analysis of the valence of the cognitive responses revealed, as expected, a significant 
effect of argument quality (F(1,123) = 9.41, p < 0.003). Strong arguments ( M =  0.31) 
elicited more positive evaluations than weak arguments ( M  = -0.64). Furthermore, 
more positive evaluations were observed after exposure to ingroup arguments 
( M =  0.12) than after exposure to outgroup arguments ( M =  -0.49, F(1,123) = 3.90, 
p < 0.05) and contra arguments resulted in more positive responses ( M  = 0.16) than 
pro arguments ( M =  -0.51, F(1,123) =4.97, p < 0.03). These effects were qualified 
by the source by position interaction (F(1,123) = 6.05, p < 0.02). It appeared that 
pro arguments resulted in more negative responses ( M  = - 1.23) than contra argu- 
ments ( M =  0.22, F(l,123) = 10.54, p < 0.002), when they were believed to originate 
from an outgroup, but not when they were believed to originate from the ingroup 
(ingroup, pro: M = 0.14; ingroup, contra: M = 0.10, F < 1). The negative evaluations 
elicited by pro arguments originating from an outgroup may be due to the circum- 
stance that they were both counter-attitudinal (subjects tended to be opposed to 
the use of entrance exams) and generated by an outgroup. This could indicate some 
bias in the judgement of arguments. 
Although the source by quality interaction did not reach significance 
(F(1,123) = 1.32, n.s.), means for this interaction display an interesting pattern. Strong 
ingroup arguments ( M  = 0.76) elicited more positive cognitive responses than weak 
ingroup arguments ( M =  -0.53, F(1,123) =9.14, p < 0.003), while the evaluation of 
strong ( M  = -0.20) and weak ( M  = -0.76) outgroup arguments did not differ signifi- 
cantly (F(1,123) = 1.72, n.s.). This could indicate more elaboration of the ingroup 
message (cf: hypothesis 2). Strong arguments are expected to result in more positive 
cognitive responses than weak arguments only when arguments are processed syste- 
matically (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). Viewed from a different angle, an 
alternative explanation presents itself. While no differences in message evaluation 
between in- and outgroup were found for weak arguments ( F <  I), strong ingroup 
arguments were evaluated more positively than strong outgroup arguments 
(F( 1,123) = 5.40, p < 0.03). The fact that strong arguments are judged more positively 
when they originate from ingroup than when they originate from outgroup may 
be viewed as an instance of ingroup bias (more generally described by e.g. Tajfel, 
1978). When arguments are weak no bias is apparent. 
As in the first study, regression analyses were performed to investigate the relation- 
ship between valence of cognitive responses and attitudes. Since analysing pro and 
contra argument conditions separately would yield rather low N's, attitudes were 
recoded so that pro and contra conditions could be combined. Evaluations were 
only predictive of attitudes when subjects were exposed to prototypical ingroup 
arguments (p = 0.34, p < 0.02), which suggests that only prototypical ingroup argu- 
ments were processed systematically (cf. hypothesis 3). 
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Argument recall 
The number of arguments correctly recalled was rated by independent judges, who 
agreed in 82 per cent of the cases. Mean scores for the two judges were analysed. 
Testing yielded a significant source by quality interaction (F( 1,123) = 4.78, 
p < 0.03). Strong outgroup arguments ( M =  1.88) resulted in less recall than weak 
outgroup arguments ( M =  2.27, F(1,123) = 5.20, p < 0.03), while no differences in 
recall for strong ( M  = 2.17) and weak ingroup arguments ( M  = 2.03) were found 
( F <  1). Two possible interpretations of this result may be suggested. Assuming there 
is no interest in outgroup messages, which would result in less elaboration of outgroup 
arguments, one would expect recall of outgroup arguments to be generally lower. 
When, however, the outgroup message appears to offer the opportunity to derogate 
the outgroup or the outgroup message, in this case when outgroup arguments are 
clearly weak, one may be motivated to scrutinize the outgroup message, resulting 
in higher recall of weak outgroup arguments. The means for the number of issue- 
relevant cognitive responses for the source by quality interaction (more responses 
after exposure to strong ingroup or weak outgroup arguments) seem to support 
this view. An alternative interpretation of this interaction effect is that it is not 
caused by processing differences, but rather by a bias in message recall. Arguments 
offering the opportunity to reach or maintain a negative judgement of the outgroup 
or outgroup message (i.e. weak arguments) are preferred, and hence better recalled. 
Both interpretations suggest a preference for strong ingroup and weak outgroup 
arguments. 
A probably related effect is the source by position interaction (F(1,123) = 5.04, 
p < 0.03). Pro arguments from an ingroup source ( M  = 1.96) and contra arguments 
from an outgroup source ( M  = 1.97) tended to result in less recall than contra argu- 
ments from an ingroup source ( M  = 2.24) and pro arguments from an outgroup 
source ( M  = 2.20). Means did, however, not differ significantly. A possible interpre- 
tation of this interaction is that one wishes to maintain the idea that one agrees 
with the ingroup or disagrees with the outgroup (subjects tended to be opposed 
to the use of entrance exams, and would hence tend to agree with the position 
advocated by the contra arguments). This interpretation would again suggest the 
presence of biases in message recall. Recall appears to be better for information 
supporting the notion that one is similar to ingroup or dissimilar to outgroup. Results 
from a different area of research show that recall is better for information consistent 
with attitudinal preferences (Roberts, 1985). The recall effects reported here might 
be indicative of a similar bias. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results reported above offer support for the hypothesized tendency to conform 
to ingroup norms. After exposure to an ingroup message and information about 
ingroup attitudes, subjects appeared to conform to the source group norm, while 
this was not the case after exposure to outgroup arguments. This differential effect 
supports the self-categorizational contention of the mediating role social categoriza- 
tion will play in inducing attitude change. Although prototypical arguments were 
perceived to be of higher quality in Experiment 1, the predicted higher quality ratings 
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for prototypical ingroup arguments were not observed in Experiment 2. This issue 
will be addressed after the discussion of the processing effects below. 
Results for the analysis of the relation between message elaboration and argument 
prototypicality seem to be somewhat equivocal. Although in the first study results 
for argument recall and the cognitive response-attitude relation seemed to be suppor- 
tive of the notion that prototypical arguments were processed more systematically, 
results for attitudes and number of cognitive responses were not indicative of differen- 
tial processing. In the second study cognitive responses were only predictive of 
attitudes after exposure to prototypical ingroup arguments, suggesting systematic 
processing. However, no further evidence of differential processing of prototypical 
ingroup arguments was found. On the whole, message elaboration appeared to be 
rather low. This may in part have been due to the specific manipulation of argument 
prototypicality, which bore a direct relation to attitudes. In Experiment 2 the source 
opinion was explicitly stated in advance. This information might have functioned 
as a simple persuasion cue (cf. Chaiken, 1980, 1987), offering subjects the possibility 
to gather the preferred information (the source opinion) without engaging in extensive 
message elaboration. In the absence of such information, prototypical messages may 
indeed elicit systematic processing’. This notion appears, however, to require further 
investigation. 
The fact that in the second study prototypicality did not affect ratings of (ingroup) 
argument quality might be ascribed to the presumably low degree of message elabor- 
ation. Possibly a minimal degree of elaboration is needed for prototypicality to affect 
perceptions of argument quality3. Again, further testing seems in order before firm 
conclusions may be drawn here. 
The present studies may be related to a different body of research when they 
are reformulated as pertaining to minority/majority influence. Prototypical arguments 
may be argued to represent the majority’s point of view, while a-prototypical argu- 
ments would represent a minority. Persuasion based on minority communication 
is contended to involve more cognitive effort than majority-induced persuasion (e.g. 
Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986; see Maass and Clark, 1984, for a review). Contrary 
to this assertion, the present results would appear to indicate more scrutinizing of 
majority than minority arguments. This apparent contradiction might be attributed 
to the specific experimental framing. A majority-minority categorization is not neces- 
sarily implicated: any group member may hold both prototypical and a-prototypical 
arguments. However, although no conclusions concerning minority-majority 
influence should be based on the present study, taking other evidence for higher 
elaboration of majority communications into consideration (Mackie, 1987), it might 
be better to replace questions about whether or not minority influence is based 
on more cognitive effort with questions about when minorities and majorities are 
likely to elicit systematic processing or the conditions under which minority and 
majority influence processes will and will not differ (cf. Chaiken and Stangor, 1987). 
As was noted by an anonymous reviewer, the attitude topic appears not to be group definitional, i.e. 
it is not particularly ingroup relevant, which may have rendered the motivation to elaborate rather low 
as compared to a situation in which a more ingroup-relevant topic is under scrutiny. 1.e. the choice 
of topic may have rendered systematic processing somewhat less likely. 
’ As was noted by an anonymous reviewer, the possibility that perceptions of prototypical argument 
quality were a consequence rather than an antecedent of position acceptance cannot be ruled out. Although 
group norms affected both attitudes and perceived argument quality, this does not necessarily mean 
that group norms affected attitudes through perceived higher quality of prototypical arguments. 
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It was proposed that the results for the analysis of the cognitive responses and 
argument recall in experiment 2 suggested an intergroup bias in message processing 
and recall. Ingroup arguments elicited more positive responses (when counter-attitu- 
dinal) than outgroup arguments, and recall appeared to be better for arguments 
supporting the view that the outgroup’s position is ill-founded and that one agrees 
with ingroup of disagrees with outgroup. Results of a study by Mackie, Gastardo- 
Conaco and Skelly (1990) seem to suggest a similar bias in argument recall. Mackie 
et al. presented subjects with both position-congruent and -incongruent arguments 
from either an in- or outgroup member. Position-congruent ingroup arguments 
resulted in higher recall than position-incongruent ingroup arguments, while the 
reverse was true for outgroup arguments. Furthermore, strong position-congruent 
ingroup arguments resulted in higher recall than weak arguments, while again the 
reverse pattern was found for outgroup arguments. This seems to suggest a preference 
for arguments supporting the view that the ingroup is consistent, while the outgroup 
is inconsistent, and that the ingroup position is well-founded, while the outgroup 
position is ill-founded. The recall biases in the study by Mackie et al. appeared 
to be clearest when the source position was known beforehand, i.e. when message 
elaboration may be assumed to be low. As was argued above, message elaboration 
appeared to be rather low in the second study presented here. It could be argued 
that the processing and recall biases reported here will be more likely to appear 
under conditions of low elaboration. When message elaboration is low one apparently 
employs simple decision rules (cf. Chaiken, 1980, 1987) suggesting higher validity 
of ingroup norms and ingroup messages. Although it is not possible to test for 
this possibility in the present study, the results of the study by Mackie et al. seem 
to corroborate this explanation. 
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